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FEB112004

FILE:

Office: BALTIMORE, MARYLAND Date:

IN RE:

Applicant:

APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and

Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



Mantifying data deleted to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Dohart D. Wiemann Director

Robert P. Wiemann, Director Administrative Appeals Office **DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Baltimore, Maryland, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native of India and citizen of Canada who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The applicant is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative as the spouse of a U.S. citizen. He now seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), so that he may remain in the United States and reside with his U.S. citizen spouse and children.

The District Director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed upon his spouse or children. The application was denied accordingly. *See District Director's Decision* dated January 2, 2003.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("Service", now known as Citizenship and Immigration Services, "CIS") misapplied the extreme hardship standard set forth in section 212(h) of the Act, and that the evidence in the record establishes extreme hardship to the applicant's qualifying relatives.

Section 212(a)(2) of the Act states in pertinent part, that:

- (A)(i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of-
 - (I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (h) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security, "Secretary"] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraphs $(A)(i)(I) \dots$ of subsection $(a)(2) \dots$ if -
 - (1) (B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien

The record reflects that on April 13, 1995 in the Circuit Court, Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, Brevard County, Florida the applicant was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (grand theft) and sentenced to 12 months probation. Although the applicant pled *nolo contendere*, his conviction and sentenced of a crime involving moral turpitude renders him inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act.

Section 212(h) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be

considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. See Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In the present case, the applicant must demonstrate extreme hardship to his U.S. citizen spouse or children.

Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999) provides a list of factors the BIA deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

On appeal, counsel states that CIS failed to correctly assess emotional and financial damage to the applicant's spouse (Ms. Sagala) and children. In support of this assertion, counsel submitted a brief, an affidavit from the applicant's spouse, and other documentation showing that the applicant and his spouse reside together. In his brief counsel emphasizes the hardship to the applicant as set out in *Matter of O-J-O*, Interim Decision 3280 (BIA 1996) and in *Matter of Anderson*, Interim Decision 596, 597 (BIA 1978) Both *Matter of O-J-O*, *Id.* and *Matter of Anderson Id.* dealt with suspension of deportation where hardship to the applicant is taken into consideration. "Extreme hardship" to an alien herself cannot be considered in determining eligibility for a section 212(h) waiver of inadmissibility. *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968).

Furthermore in the brief and in the affidavit submitted by Ms. Salagala, it is stated that she would suffer emotionally and financially if her spouse's waiver application is not approved and she may be forced to relocate to Canada if her husband was not permitted to reside in the United States. Ms. Salagala states that she does not want to move to Canada because she does not want to live in any other country, her entire family is here and she cannot cope with living in a cold climate. These statements do not evidence extreme hardship. While there may be some financial difficulties in moving to Canada, no evidence has been provided to indicate that she and her husband would be unable to establish a similar lifestyle in Canada. Nor have they indicated any medical conditions that could not be treated in Canada.

There are no laws that require Ms. Salagala to leave the United States and live abroad. In Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F. 2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States." The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. See Shooshtary v. INS, 39 F. 3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994).

The statement of financial hardship to the applicant's spouse is contradicted by the fact that, pursuant to section 213A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1183a, and the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 213a, the person who files an application for an immigration visa or for adjustment of status on or after December 19, 1997 must execute a Form I-864 (Affidavit of Support) which is legally enforceable on behalf of a beneficiary (the applicant) who is an immediate relative or a family—sponsored immigrant when an applicant applies for an immigrant visa. The statute and the regulations do not provide for an alien beneficiary to execute an affidavit of support on

behalf of a U.S. citizen or resident alien petitioner. Therefore, a claim that an alien beneficiary is needed for the purpose of supporting a citizen or resident alien petitioner can only be considered as a hardship in rare instances.

Counsel also submitted information on one-parent families in support of his assertion that the children would suffer extreme hardship if their father is removed from the family. As with his spouse, there was no evidence provided that his U.S. citizen children would suffer extreme hardship if they were to relocate to Canada.

U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See Hassan v. INS, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. Hassan v. INS, supra, held further that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. The U.S. Supreme Court additionally held in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality reflects that the applicant has failed to show that his U.S. citizen spouse or children would suffer extreme hardship if he were removed from the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.